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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 35677 (hereinaffer, 35677), district court case
no. CRF-06-24866, and ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 35684 (hereinaffer, 35684),
district court case no. CRF-07-11983, have been consolidated for purposes of appeal.
In 35677, Mr. Aschinger was initially charged with lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen; and in 35684, he was charged with video voyeurism.
In 35684, Mr. Aschinger filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered
during a police search of a computer that was jointly owned by Mr. Aschinger and his
wife. The district court denied this motion. Mr. Aschinger then entered a conditional
guilty plea to the charge of video voyeurism, reserving the right to challenge on appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State also
agreed to amend the charge of lewd conduct to felony injury to a child in exchange for
Mr. Aschinger's Alford' plea.
Mr. Aschinger timely appeals from his judgments of conviction and sentence. He
asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the warantless search of his laptop in 35684. He further asserts that the
district court imposed excessive sentences in both 35677and 35684, and therefore the
court abused its discretion.

' North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinss
Mr. Aschinger was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and
video voyeurism. (R., pp.63-66.) The video voyeurism charge resulted from a search of
Mr. Aschinger's personal laptop computer that purportedly revealed a digital video file of
a young girl changing into a bathing suit under Mr. Aschinger's user account on the
laptop. (35684 Tr., p.55, L.2

- p.56,

L.8.) Police were in possession of the laptop

because Mr. Aschinger's former wife, Kristen Aschinger, brought it in after seeing some
pictures on the computer that she thought were inappropriate. (35684 Tr., p.1 I,Ls. 823.) The law enforcement officer that she spoke to asked if police could keep the laptop
and search it, and Ms. Aschinger agreed. (35684 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-20.)
Mr. Aschinger filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained through the
search of his computer and any police observations from that search and seizure of
evidence.

(R., pp.76-77.)

In his amended motion to suppress this evidence, he

asserted that the warrantless search of the contents of the computer violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because Ms. Aschinger did not have actual or apparent authority to
consent to search Mr. Aschinger's files on the computer. (R., pp.117-I 19.)
At the hearing on Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress, the State presented
testimony from two police officers involved in the investigation of the charges at issue in
this case, as well as Mr. Aschinger's former wife.'

~ , Ls.10-17, p.32,
(35684 ~ r . p.11,

The district court also heard argument at this hearing regarding the potential use of
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and the potential joinder of four charges. (35684 Tr., p.5, L.16 p.6, L.20.) Since the district court's rulings on these issues were not preserved as part
of the conditional guilty plea in this case, this portion of the pre-trial hearing will not be
included as part of the statement of facts and course of proceedings for purposes of this
appeal.

Ls.18-23, p.45, Ls.1-4.)

Ms. Aschinger initially brought the laptop to the Post Falls

Police Department while she and Mr. Aschinger were in the process of a divorce.
(35684Tr., p.11, L.23-p.13, L.1.)
Ms. Aschinger testified that she was looking at digital photographs of her children
on the laptop when she saw other pictures that caused her concern. (35684 Tr., p.13,
L.8

-

p.14, L.14.)

Some of these pictures were pornographic in nature.

(35684

Tr., p.19, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Aschinger related that she and her husband had separate user
accounts for the laptop, although they both used the computer. (35684 Tr., p.15, Ls.2325; p.17, Ls.4-21.)

Ms. Aschinger was uncertain as to whether the separate user

accounts had individual passwords, or whether Mr. Aschinger had a password
specifically for his user account. (35684 Tr., p.17, L.15 - p.18, L.4.)
When Ms. Aschinger originally brought the computer in to the Post Falls Police
Department, she spoke with Officer Dave Beck. (35684 Tr., p.32, L.18

- p.34,

L.5.)

Ms. Aschinger showed the officer digital pictures on the laptop of a young girl, S.P., with
a bathing suit on. (35684 Tr., p.35, Ls.5-13.) According to the officer, Ms. Aschinger
was able to access these pictures without any apparent difficulty. (35684 Tr., p.35, L.22

- p.36, L.6.)

After showing Officer Beck the pictures, Ms. Aschinger agreed to leave the

computer with the officer so that he could access the contents of the laptop. (35684
Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.12.) She also provided law enforcement with a letter giving
consent to search the laptop a few weeks later. (35684 Tr., p.38, Ls.11-15.)

Because there are two volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, citations to
the transcript will be made in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court case number
under which that transcript was produced.

After the laptop was left with the Post Falls Police Department, it was eventually
searched by Officer Mark Brandtl. (35684 Tr., p.45, Ls.1-24.) There were at least three
user accounts listed on the laptop: KNA, VPA, and KID. (35684 Tr., p.50, Ls.7-11.)
Ms. Aschinger testified that she believed her user account was "KNA." (35684 Tr., p.20,
Ls.1-4.) Despite the fact that Ms. Aschinger had a different user account than her
husband, Officer Brandtl was directed to access Mr. Aschinger's user account - "VPA."
(35684 Tr., p.48, Ls.9-15.)
Officer Brandtl used a computer forensics program to create a copy of the hard
drive of the laptop in order to search the contents of the computer without altering any of
the laptop's files. (35684 Tr., p.51, Ls.5-13.) Although the officer wasn't aware of any
passwords, and didn't enter any himself, his understanding was that the forensics
program being used to create a mirror image of the hard drive was capable of overriding
password protection on computers and that the mirror image of the hard drive could
"absolutely" be created without any passwords from a particular user account. (35684
Tr., p.49, Ls.2-5, p.56, Ls.23-24, p.58, Ls.10-22.) During Officer Brandtl's search of the
laptop, he uncovered several pictures of partially clothed and naked women, several
pictures of S.P. in a bathing suit, a video file of S.P. changing from her clothes into a
bathing suit, and still images that appeared to be taken from the video file of S.P.
changing. (35684 Tr., p.54, L.3 - p.55, L.21.) While he testified that he didn't see an
indication of encryption software when reviewing the images on the laptop, the officer
also stated that such software, "could have been on there." (35684 Tr., p.61, Ls.23-25.)
Officer Brandtl also testified that he would be unable, with the mirror image program that
he was using, to determine whether there were password-protected files on the

computer. (35684 Tr., p.64, Ls.19-25.) The officer also turned on the laptop and logged
on to Mr. Aschinger's user account during his testimony, although he did not attempt to
access any of Mr. Aschinger's files. (35684 Tr., p.50, Ls.4-25.)
After the close of the State's evidence, Mr. Aschinger argued to the district court
that police extended the search beyond that which Ms. Aschinger had already
undertaken as a private search. (35684 Tr., p.70, L.13 - p.71, L.3.) He also analogized
the search of the computer to the search of a home for purposes of the scope of
consent. (35684 Tr., p.71, L.4 - p.72, L.24.) This analogy was largely based upon the
common function and role of computers in modern life as the receptacle of our most
private information. (35684 Tr., p.72, Ls.1-10.) Because police made no attempt to limit
their search to just those areas where Ms. Aschinger had the apparent authority to give
consent

- i.e.

those files accessible through her own user account

- Mr. Aschinger

argued that the scope of the warrantless search of the laptop by law enforcement
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. (35684 Tr., p.70, L.9- p.73, L.25.)
The State responded that Ms. Aschinger had brought the computer to police and
provided consent to search the computer, which was sufficient to permit the search.
(35684, Tr., p.76, L.14

- p.77, L.16.)

The State also disputed that the contents of a

computer should receive the same degree of protection that is accorded to a search of
someone's home. (35684 Tr., p.77, Ls.10-15.)
After reviewing case law regarding private searches and seizures, the district
court found that Ms. Aschinger was not acting through the direction of law enforcement
when she brought them the laptop. (35684 Tr., p.80, Ls.13-23.) The district court also
found that there was no evidence that tended to suggest that Mr. Aschinger had any

password protection on his files contained on the laptop. (35684 Tr., p.81, Ls.5-20.)
Additionally, the district court, relying on the case of U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246

(loth Cir.

2007), determined that Mr. Aschinger had moved his laptop to a "public

space," without taking measures to protect the contents of the computer from public
inspection. Finally, the district court found that the demonstration of logging on to the
computer made by Officer Brandtl and the testimony of Ms. Aschinger showed that
Mr. Aschinger failed to take steps to preserve the privacy of the individual user
accounts. (35684 Tr., p.83, Ls.8-17.) In light of this, the court held that Mr. Aschinger
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer and there was no
Fourth Amendment violation.
As an additional ground for denying the motion to suppress, the district court
concluded that the scope of the search by police did not exceed the original private
"search" conducted by Ms. Aschinger. (35684 Tr., p.84, L.5

- p.86,

L.4.) Based on

these conclusions, the district court denied Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of the warantless search of his laptop computer. (35684
Tr., p.86, Ls.7-16.)
Mr. Aschinger entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of video voyeurism.
(35684 Tr., p.108, L.17

-

p.109, L.20, p.115, L.20 - p.116, L.8; R., pp.178-179.) He

reserved the right to challenge, on appeal, the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress the evidence that was discovered by law enforcement pursuant to their search
of his computer. (35684 Tr., p.109, L.21 - p.llO, L.21; R., pp.178-179.) In 35677, the
State further agreed to amend the charge from lewd conduct to felony injury to a child in
exchange for Mr. Aschinger's Alford plea. (35677 Tr., p.4, Ls.10-15, p.10, L.17 - p.12,

L.7; R., pp. 188, 190-192.) The State also dismissed two other charges as part of the
plea agreement. (35677 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-11; R., p.192.)
Mr. Aschinger was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years, with five
years fixed, for injury to a child, and three years fixed for the offense of video
voyeurism.4 (35684 Tr., p.153, Ls.9-21; R., pp.202-203,205-206.) Mr. Aschinger timely
appealed his judgments of conviction in 35677 and 35684. (R., pp.208, 212.)

These sentences were ordered to run consecutively with an additional sentence
Mr. Aschinger received for a felony conviction in Latah County. (35684 Tr., p.153, Ls.921.) Mr. Aschinger's conviction for the charges in Latah County are not at issue in this
appeal.

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of the search of his laptop because this search
exceeded the scope of Ms. Aschinger's apparent authority to consent to the
search and also exceeded the scope of her own private search of the laptop?

2.

Did the district court impose excessive sentences in 35677 and 35684, and
thereby abuse its discretion?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Aschinger's Motion To Suppress The
Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Search Of His Laptop Because This Search
Exceeded The Scope Of Ms. Aschinger'sApparent Authority To Consent To The
Search And Also Exceeded The Scope Of Her Own Private Search Of The Laptop
A.

Introduction
This case presents what appears to be an issue of first impression for this

Court's review: to what extent can the consent of a joint user and owner of a computer
be effective to the contents of a computer that are stored and designated under another
user's account. Mr. Aschinger asserts that it was objectively unreasonable for police to
assume that the consent of his wife to search his personal computer was effective as to
the files contained on the computer that were exclusively under his own user account.
Additionally, the scope of the search conducted by law enforcement exceeded that
conducted by Ms. Aschinger, so the evidence uncovered as a result of this search was
not discovered as a result of Ms. Aschinger's private search of the laptop. Because
Ms. Aschinger lacked the actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the
files under Mr. Aschinger's user account and this search exceeded the scope of the
private search conducted by Ms. Aschinger, the district court erred when it denied
Mr. Aschinger's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless
search of his laptop computer.
B.

Standard Of Review
Upon review of a district court's decision to grant or deny a suppression motion,

the determination of whether a search violated the Fourth Amendment is a question of

law that this Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 146 ldaho 466, 469,
197 P.3d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2008). The issue of whether a third party had actual or
apparent authority to consent to a search is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.
See U.S. Y. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579, 1580-1581 (1997). While the ultimate issue of whether
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is reviewed de novo, this Court will uphold
any factual findings by the district court unless these findings are clearly erroneous. Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Aschincler's Motion To Suppress
The Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Search Of His Laptop Because This
Search Exceeded The Scope Of Ms. Aschinser's Actual Or Apparent Authority
To Consent To A Search Of The Computer
Both Article I, section 17 of the ldaho State Constitution and the Fourth

Amendments of the federal constitution protect the right of people against unreasonable
searches of their persons, houses, papers, or

effect^.^

U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho

Const. Art. I, $j17. "The Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
is implicated when police search things or places in which the defendant has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." State v. Dominguez, 137 ldaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d
325, 327 (Ct. App. 2002). Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.
State v. Smifh, 144 ldaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007). When a warrantless
search is challenged through a motion to suppress, the "burden of proof is on the state
to show that the search either fell within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the

Because the ldaho Supreme Court has already determined that the analysis of
warantless searches pursuant to third-party consent is analyzed in the same manner
and according to the same standards under the ldaho and the federal constitutions,
Mr. Aschinger does not herein separately analyze the district court's rulings regarding
this issue under each constitutional provision. See State v. McCaughey, 127 ldaho 669,
673-674, 904 P.2d 939, 943-944 (1995).

warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Id. If the
state fails to meet this burden, then the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal
search, along with later-discovered evidence derived from this search, is inadmissible in
court. State v. Brauch, 133 ldaho 215,219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999).
A search pursuant to voluntary consent is an exception to the warrant
requirement. Dominguez, 137 ldaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327. "The consent need not be
obtained from the defendant; it may be acquired from a third-party with sufficient
authority over the premises or item to be searched." Id. Common authority over the
property to be searched is founded on mutual use of the property by persons who
generally have joint access or control for most purposes. Reynolds, 146 ldaho at 473,
197 P.2d at 334 (quoting U.S. v. Maflock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, n.7 (1974)).
1.

Mr. Aschinger Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Contents
Of His Personal Computer

The Fourth Amendment protects against searches of one's property where the
individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items searched.
Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Whether the expectation of privacy in an item
is "reasonable" is not measured according to an individual's subjective belief, but is
instead measured according to whether that expectation is one "that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable." Id. (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
In measuring whether a party had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
her property, it is especially important to evaluate the nature of the property itself, as
certain items will give rise to a higher expectation of privacy than others. See, e.g.,
U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984) (concluding that a "container which

can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on
probable cause, without a warrant); U.S. v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (gth Cir. 1993)
(noting that a "purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest
expectations of privacy.") (abrogated on other grounds by U.S. v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579,
1580-1581 (gih Cir. 1997)); U.S. v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (lothCir. 1992).
Here, there can be no meaningful dispute that a computer is the type of personal
effect under the Fourth Amendment in which society is prepared to recognize a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Courts have recognized that the computer is a
"modern day repository of man's records, reflections, and conversations." See State v.
Nordlund, 53 P.3d 520, 525 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). Additionally, "[blecause computers
process personal information and effects, they require heightened protection under the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches or seizures." See People v. Gall,
30 P.3d 145, 160 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting). Because Mr. Aschinger's
personal computer was a repository for his personal effects and information, he had a
reasonable, and a heightened, expectation of privacy in his laptop computer.
While the district court held that Mr. Aschinger did not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his laptop, the district court's conclusion was predicated on an
erroneous factual finding that the computer was in a "public space" and a similarly
misplaced reliance on the case of U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246 (loth Cir. 1246).
(35684 Tr., p.82, L.14 - p.83, L.7.) In the Barrows Opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was deciding a question that involved a defendant who had brought his
personal computer into his office and who had situated his computer immediately
adjacent to a fax machine and a photocopier that were commonly used by all of the

other employees. Barrows, 481 F.3d at 1247. The defendant also placed the computer
he brought from home on a desk that he shared in common with another employee. Id.
And he kept his computer on and running at all times so that any of the employees at
the municipal office had access to the computer. Id.
Central to the court's determination in Barrows is that: (1) the area in which the
computer was located was a busy workplace; and (2) the defendant had networked his
computer so that other employees who were also in the workplace could access at least
some of his files through the networking system. Id. at 1248-1249. The Barrows Court
specifically noted that the defendant:

... knew when he chose to relocate his computer to city hall that he would
be working in a public area. City employees and members of the general
public passed in and out all day. The chances that a passerby might spy
snatches of personal material over his shoulder, or sit down to use his
computer having honestly mistaken it for a city one, were appreciable.

In sharp contrast to the highly public location of the defendant's computer in
Barrows, all of the evidence in this case shows that Mr. Aschinger's computer was kept
within the confines of his personal home. (35684 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-14.) The district court
noted as much where the court found that the laptop that was owned by Mr. and
Ms. Aschinger and searched by law enforcement was "possessed within their home."
(35684 Tr., p.80, Ls.17-18.) And a person's private home is not a public place. See,
e.g., Long v. State, 666 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (public place is any
place where members of the public are free to go without restraint and private residence
is not a public place); see also State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476,480, 974 P.2d 1105, 1109
(1999) (for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004, presence of social guests or persons with

business at the residence does not convert private driveway into property available to
the general public). As such, the district court's finding of fact that Mr. Aschinger kept
his computer in a public space was clearly erroneous, and the district court's reliance on
the Barrows opinion is without merit given the gross factual disparities between Barrows
and this case.
The district court erred when it found that Mr. Aschinger kept his computer "in a
public space" and where it was subject to public inspection. (35684 Tr., p.83, Ls. 1-4.)
Because the district court relied directly on this clearly erroneous finding, the district
court also erred when it made the determination that Mr. Aschinger did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer. (35684 Tr., p.83, Ls.4-7.)
Mr. Aschinger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer that was
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
2.

Ms. Aschinaer Lacked Actual Or Apparent Authority To Consent To A
Search Of Mr. Aschinaer's Private Computer Files And Documents That
Were Contained In His Personal User Account

As has been noted, valid consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.
Dominguez, 137 ldaho at 683, 52 P.3d at 327.

Married couples generally have

common authority over the premises that they share, and therefore generally have
authority to give consent to search those premises. Reynolds, 146 ldaho at 473, 197
P.2d at 334. However, common authority over shared premises does not necessarily
translate into the authority to consent to search specific items of property on the
premises. Id.
Third party consent cannot validate a warrantless search, no matter how
voluntarily or unambiguously the consent is given, when the circumstances show "that

the absent target of the search retains an expectation of privacy in the place or object
notwithstanding some appearance or claim of authority by the third person." U.S.v.
Block, 590 F.2d 535, 540 (4Ih Cir. 1978). The mere fact of joint access to, and use of, a
computer's hard drive does not necessarily provide for actual authority of a third party to
consent to a search of the other party's personal files contained on the computer. See,
e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4'h Cir. 2001).
In this case, while both Mr. and Ms. Aschinger had overall access to the
computer's hard drive, the evidence in this case shows that Ms. Aschinger never made
any attempt to access that private information that was stored exclusively on
Mr. Aschinger's user account. Therefore, Ms. Aschinger did not have mutual use, or
joint access and control, of the personal effects and information that was stored
exclusively on Mr. Aschinger's user account. See Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 473, 197
P.2d at 334 (quoting U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, n.7 (1974)). The police search
of the computer was limited specifically to only those files that were stored on the
computer under Mr. Aschinger's user account. (35684 Tr., p.48, Ls.9-15, p.55, L.2 p.56, L.8.) As such, the search conducted by police officers exceeded the scope of the
actual authority that Ms. Aschinger had to consent to this search.
The search also exceeded Ms. Aschinger's apparent authority to consent to the
search. Apparent authority of a third party to consent to a search exists when law
enforcement reasonably, even if erroneously, believes that the person consenting to the
search has the authority to do so. U.S.v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126, 1133 (loth Cir.
2008). In every case, in order for such consent to be valid, the officer's belief that the
person giving consent has the authority to do so must be objectively reasonable.

Brauch, 133 ldaho at 219, 984 P.2d at 707. This determination is judged by the
standard of whether the facts available to the officer at the time would warrant a person
of reasonable caution in the belief that the party giving consent has the authority to do
so. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
In this case, it is clear that police were aware that there were separate user
accounts for Mr. and Ms. Aschinger. We know this because the officer who conducted
the search was directed to search for "the specific files that were mentioned in that
report under the user name VPA." (35684 Tr., p.48, Ls.9-15.) Given the heightened
privacy interests that attach to personal computers, and the specific awareness of law
enforcement officers that Mr. and Ms. Aschinger used separate user accounts on the
laptop computer, these facts would not warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that Ms. Aschinger had the authority to consent to a search of her husband's
private computer files under his user account. Therefore, Ms. Aschinger lacked actual
or apparent authority to give valid legal consent to a search of the files that were
contained on Mr. Aschinger's separate user account.
D.

The District Court Erred When It Determined That The Search Conducted By
Law Enforcement Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Private Search Conducted
Bv Ms. Aschinaer
Mr. Aschinger further asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that

police did not exceed the private search by Ms. Aschinger when they accessed files on
the laptop that were not accessed by Ms. Aschinger.
"It is firmly established that evidence obtained through a private search, even
though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable unless government officials instigated
the search or otherwise participated in a wrongful search." State v. Pontier, 103 ldaho

91, 94, 645 P.2d 325, 328 (1982). However, law enforcement may not exceed the
scope of the private search. Walter v. US., 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980). Where a private
search merely frustrates a legitimate expectation of privacy in part, such a search does
not deprive the owner of Fourth Amendment protection for whatever legitimate
expectation of privacy remains. Id.
In Walter, a shipment of 8-millimeter film reels were mailed to the wrong address.

Id. at 651-652. When the shipment was opened, there were suggestive drawings and
explicit descriptions on the film containers. Id. at 652. The party receiving the package
thereafter called federal law enforcement officials who picked up the package. Id.
Instead of attempting to obtain a warrant to view the films, the officers viewed the films
using a projector. Id. Based on the contents of the films, the State filed obscenity
charges against the defendants. Id.
The Court in Walter noted that the fact that police were in tawful possession of
the 8-millimeter films "did not give them authority to search their contents." Id. at 654.
The Walter Court also held that the fact that the boxes containing the films had already
been opened by a private party also did not excuse the failure of law enforcement to
obtain a warrant. Id. at 656. The Court held that, "If a properly authorized official
search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of
strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of another
person's privacy." Id. at 657. Prior to police actually opening the film containers and
screening the films, the state could only draw inferences about what might be contained
on the films. Id. Therefore, the opening and the viewing of the films was deemed to be
"a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private

party and therefore must be characterized as a separate search." Id. Because an
individual retains a portion of his or her privacy interest where a private party has only
frustrated that expectation of privacy in part, a search by law enforcement that intrudes
upon what expectation of privacy remains violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 659.
While the district court relied on the decision in Burdeau v. McDowell in support
of its determination that the search conducted by police did not exceed the scope of the
search conducted by Ms. Aschinger, the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Walter expressly disapproved of such application of Burdeau as a means of insulating
subsequent searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (35684 Tr., p.79, Ls. 10-21.)
The Walter Court concluded, "Neither Burdeau v. McDowell nor Coolidge v. New
Hampshire supports the proposition that private searches insulate subsequent
governmental searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny." Walter, 447 U.S. at 660 n.2.
As noted by the Walter Court, the decision in Burdeau dealt only with the seizure of
property, not with the search of property; and, as such, the Burdeau Opinion does not
apply to an analysis of whether a private search is impermissibly expanded by police.
Id.; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-476 (1921). As such, the district court's
reliance on the Burdeau Opinion was misplaced.
Applying the principles articulated in Walter, the search conducted by law
enforcement in this case clearly exceeded that which Ms. Aschinger undertook on her
own.

Ms. Aschinger provided the computer to law enforcement after finding some

photos of S.P. that she thought were inappropriate and also finding some pornographic
images on the computer. (35684 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.14.) She never testified that

she had ever accessed Mr. Aschinger's user account. (35684 Tr., p.11, L.8

- p.31,

L.25.)
In contrast, police searched over 50,000 images on the laptop and targeted their
search to only those files contained on Mr. Aschinger's user account. (35684 Tr., p.48,
Ls.9-15.) Like the law enforcement officers in Walter, police could not have specifically
known the contents of the video and image files on Mr. Aschinger's computer without
undertaking a separate search by opening up these files. Moreover, like the officers in
Walter, this search went beyond the limited scope of the partial search that was
privately conducted. Ms. Aschinger, by her own account, never attempted to access
anything on Mr. Aschinger's user account on the laptop; and so Mr. Aschinger retained
a privacy interest in the contents of the laptop that were stored on his used account.
The police officers in this case exceeded the scope of Ms. Aschinger's private search,
and violated Mr. Aschinger's Fourth Amendment rights, when they deliberately
undertook to search the areas of the laptop that were exclusively used by Mr. Aschinger
and that were not previously part of Ms. Aschinger's own search of the computer.
In sum, the district court erred when it determined that Ms. Aschinger had actual
or apparent authority to consent to the search of files and information on the laptop
computer that were contained on Mr. Aschinger's separate user account. The district
court also erred when it determined that the search conducted by law enforcement did
not exceed the scope of the private search that Ms. Aschinger had conducted on her
own.

As such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Aschinger's motion to

suppress the evidence that was obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the
files contained on Mr. Aschinger's personal computer.

II.
The District Court Imposed Excessive Sentences In 35677 And 35684, And Thereby
Abused Its Discretion

Mr. Aschinger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentences of 10
years, with five years fixed, for felony injury to a child and three years fixed for video
voyeurism are excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho
771,653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982).
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[wlhere a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75
(1979)). Mr. Cellan does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Cellan must show that in light
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). The
governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation;
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting Sfate v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho
382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).

This Court reviews the length of the entire

sentence upon a claim that the sentence was excessive. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
A review of Mr. Aschinger's criminal history reveals that, prior to 2006 when the
charges at issue in this appeal were brought, he had a fairly minimal criminal history.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4.) He also had no prior
record of sexual offenses at all. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Given that all of the charges for sexual
offenses arose at around the same point in time in Mr. Aschinger's life, and given the
fact that he does not appear to have ever received the' benefit of any therapeutic
resources to address these offenses, there is strong reason to believe that with
appropriate therapeutic resources, and threat that Mr. Aschinger might otherwise pose
to the community would be effectively minimized.
Additionally, Mr. Aschinger was raised in a home where his parents regularly hit
Mr. Aschinger with physical objects such as belts and cords, and even placed him
outside in the snow with very little clothing due to his parents' issues controlling their
anger. (PSI, p.8.) He also moved many times when he was younger, which was
frustrating for Mr. Aschinger and led him to socially withdraw from many of his peers.
(PSI, p.8.) The combined effects of his parents' anger and abuse with the lack of an
outside support network quite likely had a contributing effect on Mr. Aschinger's current
offenses.
In light of the record in this case, the district court's sentences of ten years, with
five years fixed, for felony injury to a child and three years fixed for video voyeurism
were beyond what was reasonably required in order to protect society and to serve the

related goals of rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. As such, these sentences
were excessive and constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Aschinger respectfully requests that this Court vacate Mr. ~schinger's
judgment of conviction and sentence in 35684 and reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress. In the alternative, he asks that this Court reduce his
sentences in 35677 and 35684 as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 2othday of March, 2009.
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